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Tbombs23's avatar

After ABE is run, and reveals discrepancies, will that lead to hand recounts?

A problem with ballot images is they could be changed, and ABE would not detect that the image count doesn't match the paper ballots count. With most voting machines having internal wireless modems, and outdated OS's and black box proprietary software, how can apply your approach to reassurance that the ballot images have not been altered?

I really love your work, but unfortunately we have been gaslit that our elections are very secure, when in fact there are many security vulnerabilities, such as multiple voting machines being physically accessed in multiple states, and voting software copied and distributed, prior to the 2024 election.

We need more transparency, and we also need to remove any chances of bad actors to interfere in the election, and that includes preventing ballot images from being altered. I think live camera's could help, and USB data transmission from precinct to county, and then county to state. Any time data is transmitted wirelessly , it is vulnerable. Quickly published results are not worth sacrificing security and vulnerability.

John R Brakey's avatar

Tbombs23: You are right to ask that question. Ballot images should not be accepted on blind trust, and they should never replace the hand-marked paper ballot. The paper ballot is still the original record of voter intent.

The real value of ballot images is redundancy. When the original hand-marked paper ballot, the ballot image, and the cast vote record are all tied together, they create a way to verify the election from more than one direction.

That is why the images should be hashed when they are created. A hash is like a digital fingerprint. If a ballot image is changed later, the hash will not match. The ballot image is then connected to the cast vote record, so we can see how that ballot was interpreted by the voting system. Finally, selected ballot images can be matched back to the original hand-marked paper ballots.

So the system is not saying, “Trust the ballot images.” It is saying, “Verify the ballot images.” Verify them against their hashes. Verify the cast vote records against the images. Verify the images against the original paper ballots.

That redundancy matters because not everyone can physically inspect hand-marked paper ballots. Those ballots have to remain protected under chain-of-custody rules. But ballot images, if preserved, hashed, published, and linked to the cast vote record, can give the public a practical way to review the election at scale.

If an image does not match its hash, or if the cast vote record does not match the image, or if the image does not match the original paper ballot, that should trigger further investigation and, where necessary, a broader hand audit or recount.

That is how we rebuild public confidence: not by asking people to trust election officials or machines, but by creating a transparent, redundant system where the records check each other and the public can verify the results for themselves.

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